Question

# Use the following extensive-form game to answer the following questions. a. List the feasible strategies for player 1 an...

Use the following extensive-form game to answer the following questions. a. List the feasible strategies for player 1 and player 2. b. Identify the Nash equilibria to this game. c. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium. Transcribed: (60, 120) A (50, 50) (0, 0) (100, 150)

a. Feasible strategy for player 1 are: {A,B}

Feasible strategy for player 2 are: {(ZX),(ZW),(YX),(YW)}

b. To find the Nash equilibrium of this game consider the following normal form of the game: Player 1 (P1) has two strategies to choose from and Player 2 (P2) has 4 strategies available.

When P2 chooses ZX, P1 chooses B. When P2 chooses ZW, P1 chooses B only. And when P2 chooses YX or YW then P1 chooses A as this gives him better payoff.

Similarly, for P2, when P1 chooses A P2 is indifferent between ZW and YW. When P1 chooses B P2 is indifferent between ZX and ZW.

This gives us three pair of Nash equilibrium strategies:

(A, YW)

(B, ZX)

(B, ZW)

c. To find the sub-game perfect equilibrium we use the method of backward induction and we need to mark the sub-games (SG). The number of sub-games is equal to the number of decision nodes that is 3 sub-games will be there. The following chart shows the three sub-games: In SG1 P2 is at the deciding node, he has to choose from W or X. W will give P2 a higher payoff.

In SG2 P2 chooses Z which gives him higher payoff from the available strategies Y and Z.

This gives the new game below: Now P1 has to choose from A or B from which he chooses B.

Thus, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game is:

(B, ZW)

Similar Questions

Recent Questions